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Abstract
This article investigates the business cycle implications of the planning phase
of business investment projects. Time to plan is built into a Kydland-Prescott
time-to-build model, which assumes that investment projects take four
periods to complete. In the Kydland-Prescott time-to-build model, resources
for these projects flow uniformly across the four periods; in the time-to-plan
model, few resources are used in the first period. The investigation
determines that incorporating time to plan in this way improves the model’s
ability to account for three key features of U.S. business cycles: their
persistence, or the fact that when output growth is above (or below) average,
it tends to remain high (or low) for a few quarters; the fact that productivity
leads hours worked over the business cycle; and the fact that business
investment in structures and business investment in equipment lag output
over the cycle.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Amajorgoal ofmacroeconomicresearchforthe pastthree
decades has been the integration of macroeconomics and
microeconomics. Work aiming to reach that goal has tak-
en two related paths. One type of work has tried to give
theoretical macroeconomic models ﬁrmer microeconomic
foundations.Theotherhastriedtousemicroeconomicdata
setstoconstructandparameterizemacroeconomicmodels.
An example of this second type is Kydland and Prescott’s
(1982) classic Econometrica article, “Time to Build and
AggregateFluctuations.” Inthatarticle, KydlandandPres-
cott specify the investment gestation lags in a macroeco-
nomic model based on published studies of major invest-
ment projects.
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According to these studies, investment projects have
two noteworthy features. One is that they usually require
more time to complete than the quarterly time period in a
typical macroeconomic model. This time-to-build feature
ofinvestmentprojectsisemphasizedbyKydlandandPres-
cott (1982). The other noteworthy feature of investment
projects is that they typically begin with a lengthy plan-
ning phase, during which architectural plans are drawn up,
ﬁnancing is arranged, permits are obtained from various
local authorities, and so on.
2 While these are important ac-
tivities that can involve some high-priced talent, the actual
resource cost of this phase is small in relation to the over-
all cost of investment projects. The really resource-inten-
sive phase, when physical construction actually occurs,
begins later. The planning phase is typically quite long. Of
the total time from a project’s conception to its comple-
tion, on average, about a third is spent in the low resource
use planning phase.
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Our investigation of these features of investment proj-
ects reveals that they have substantial business cycle im-
plications. But it is the planning phase that is particularly
important. The fact that investment projects take time per
se has relatively modest implications for business cycle
dynamics. That is documented by Kydland and Prescott
(1982). They compare a model that has a four-quarter
time-to-build technology but no planning period (in which
the investment costs are spread evenly across the four
quarters) with a model that has a one-quarter time-to-build
technology. They report that, for the most part, the busi-




We will show that the planning phase of business invest-
ment helps account for at least three key features of busi-
ness cycles: their persistence, the fact that productivity
leads hours worked over the business cycle, and the fact
that business investment in structures and business invest-
ment in equipment lag output over the business cycle.
Persistence
The persistence of business cycles refers to the fact that
when the growth of output is above average, it tends to re-
main high for a few quarters, and when it is below aver-
age, it tends to remain low. A statistic for measuring per-
sistence of output is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the
growth of gross domestic product (GDP), that is, the cor-
relation of GDP growth in one quarter with its growth in
the preceding quarter. That autocorrelation in postwar U.S.
data is 0.37.
The only way standard real business cycle models can
account for this degree of persistence is by assuming per-
sistence in the growth rate of the disturbances, or shocks,
that drive the business cycle. For example, Christiano
(1988) documents that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of
equilibrium GDP growth in a standard model (with one-
period time to build) corresponds roughly to the autocorre-
lation of the growth rate of the exogenous shock to the
level of technology. The fact that standard models require
persistent shocks to account for persistence in output is
said to reﬂect the fact that the models are missing some
important internal propagation mechanisms (Rouwenhorst
1991, Watson 1993, Rotemberg and Woodford 1994, and
Cogley and Nason 1995).
Enhancing internal propagation in models requires in-
corporating real-world features that have the effect of de-
laying the response of factors of production to the primary
underlying shocks. We argue that, depending on the exact
source of the shocks, the investment planning period can
be such a feature.
5 The need for a time-intensive, but low
resource-using, planning phase at the start of new invest-
ment projects implies that the ﬂow of resources into in-
vestmentcannotbequicklychanged,regardlessofthetype
of shock. For shocks that are transmitted to factors of pro-
duction primarily by changes in investment, the delay in
the response of investment translates into a delay in the
response of factors of production. The technology shock
in standard real business cycle models is such a distur-
bance. In this type of model, there is no planning period
and hours worked responds positively to a positive tech-
nology shock. An important motivation underlying this
work response is households’ incentive to accumulate the
investable resources they need to exploit the high rate of
return on investment associated with a positive technology
shock. By eliminating this incentive, incorporating a plan-
ning period into a standard real business cycle model has
the effect of delaying the hours-worked response to a tech-
nology shock.
Incorporating the planning period does not have the ef-
fect of delaying the response of factors of production to
every kind of shock. For example, if shocks to government
consumption are temporary, the optimal response to such
a shock in a standard real business cycle model is to let
investment drop in order to absorb the rise in government
consumption. This drop in effect allows households to in-
sulatetheresponseofhoursworkedandconsumptionfrom
the shock. But when there is a planning period, invest-
ment cannot play this role, so hours worked must rise sub-
stantially in the period of the shock to avoid a substantial
crowdingoutofconsumption.Thus, forthiskindofshock,
incorporating the planning period into the model actually
enhances the response of hours worked.
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In our analysis, we use variants of the Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) model, which includes both technolo-
gy and government consumption shocks. In that model,
the technology shock is the primary disturbance driving
thebusinesscycle.Therefore,incorporatingtheinvestment
planning period into this model enhances persistence.
We discover that the amount of persistence introduced
by the planning period is actually quite substantial. To es-
tablish a benchmark, we ﬁrst consider the conventional
time-to-build speciﬁcation of constant resource use over
four periods. We ﬁnd that, in this case, when the growthrate of the exogenous technology shock has no ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation, neither does equilibrium output growth.
We then adapt this speciﬁcation to accommodate a plan-
ning period by assuming that essentially no resources are
used in the ﬁrst period of a project, while a constant ﬂow
of resources is required in the remaining three periods. As
before, we specify that the exogenous technology shock
displays no autocorrelation in its growth rate. However,
unlikebefore,equilibriumoutputgrowthnowdisplayspos-
itive autocorrelation. Indeed, the model’s ﬁrst-order auto-
correlation is 0.36, virtually the value observed in the data.
Productivity and Hours Worked
We also show that the planning period helps account for
the fact that output per hour worked (productivity) leads
hours worked over the business cycle. The reason it does
has to do with the impact of the planning period on the dy-
namiceffectsofthetechnologyshock.Asdiscussedabove,
initially hours worked does not rise after a positive tech-
nology shock because agents are awaiting the completion
of the planning phase of investment projects conceived in
the period of the shock. Because of the damped response
of hours worked, productivity rises substantially in the pe-
riod of the shock. Later, after the planning phase of new
investmentprojectsiscomplete,hoursworkedsurges.This
pattern of response to a technology shock—ﬁrst produc-
tivity risesa lot; then hoursworked rises—accounts forthe
model’s prediction that productivity leads hours worked
over the cycle.
Business Investment in Structures and Equipment
As noted above, the planning period has the effect of de-
laying the response of investment to shocks. Thus, after a
positive technology shock, output rises immediately, but
investment rises only with a delay. This is why the model
predicts that investment lags output over the business cy-
cle. This implication is consistent with an important fea-
ture of the data, namely, that business investment in struc-
tures and business investment in equipment lag aggregate
output (Kydland and Prescott 1990, Greenwood and
Hercowitz 1991, Fisher 1994b). Presumably, business in-
vestment in structures is the category of investment for
which the planning period is most directly relevant. The
planning period may also have an indirect effect on in-
vestment in equipment via the complementarity of struc-
tures and equipment.
The Models...
In our analysis, we use three types of models.
Forcomparison,weanalyzeastandardrealbusinesscy-
cle model which abstracts altogether from gestation con-
siderations in investment, by specifying that the comple-
tion of an investment project requires just one period. The
speciﬁc model we use for comparison is the model with
technology and government consumption shocks studied
by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992, their divisible labor
model). We call this the one-period time-to-build model.
We also consider a version of this model, modiﬁed to
incorporateastandardfour-periodtime-to-buildinvestment
technology like the one proposed by Kydland and Prescott
(1982). This technology assumes that, to complete an in-
vestment project, a constant ﬂow of resources is required
over the life of the project. We call this simply the time-to-
build model. By comparing the implications of these two
models, we can assess the business cycle consequences of
time-to-buildconsiderationsperse,abstractingfrominvest-
ment planning considerations.
To quantify the business cycle impact of the planning
phase of investment projects, we consider as well a speci-
ﬁcation in which essentially no resources are used in the
period an investment project is initiated, while the remain-
ing three periods require a uniform ﬂow of resources. We
refer to this as the time-to-plan model.
In all models considered, competitive allocations coin-
cide with the choices of a ﬁctitious benevolent planner. At
time period t, that agent selects contingent plans for aggre-
gate consumption (Ct), the number of hours for house-
holds to work in the market (nt), and the beginning of pe-





t{[log(Ct)/3.92] + log(1,369 – nt)}
where 1.03
–0.25 is the discount factor; 1,369 is the endow-
ment of usable hours per period; and 3.92 is a consump-
tion/leisure weight. Aggregate consumption is related to
private and government consumption as follows:





t denotes private consumption and the parameter
y controls how government consumption, Gt, inﬂuences
the marginalutility ofprivate consumption.A positiveval-
ue for y implies that an increase in government consump-
tion reduces the marginal utility of private consumption,
as when they are substitutes, and a negative value implies
the opposite, as when they are complements.
We conﬁne our analysis to two cases: y = 1 and y =
0. When y = 1 in our models, private consumption and
government consumption are perfect substitutes; shocks to
government consumption are perfectly offset by one-for-
one adjustments in private consumption. Thus, we can say
that when y = 1 in our models, government consumption
shocks do not matter. This is not true, however, when y =
0. In that sort of model, private consumption and govern-
mentconsumptionareneithersubstitutesnorcomplements,
so shocks to government consumption will affect other
variables. Thus, we can say that when y = 0 in our mod-
els, government consumption shocks do matter. For short,
we will refer to these two versions of our models as the
versions when government does or does not matter.
The resource constraint in our models is
(3) C
p
t + Gt + It = Kt
0.344(ztnt)
0.656
where It is gross investment, output is a Cobb-Douglas
function of capital and hours worked, and the variable zt
summarizes the level of technology. The logarithm of zt
evolves as a random walk, so that zt itself is represented
as
(4) zt = zt–1exp(lt).
Here lt is a shock to the level of technology that is inde-
pendently and identically distributed as a normal distribu-
tion with mean 0.004 and standard deviation 0.018. Also,
we adopt the speciﬁcation
(5) ¯ gt = (1 – 0.96)log(190.8) + 0.96¯ gt–1 +µ twhere ¯ gt = log(Gt/zt) and µt is a shock to the level of gov-
ernment consumption that is independently and identically
distributed as a normal distribution with mean 0 and stan-
dard deviation 0.021.
To complete our model description, we describe the
technology for converting investment goods into increases
in the capital stock. In the one-period time-to-build model,
that technology is
(6) Kt+1 = (1 – 0.021)Kt + It
where 0.021 is the per-period rate of depreciation in capi-
tal. The other two models incorporate versions of Kydland
and Prescott’s (1982) general four-period time-to-build
investment technology. That is, in the time-to-build and
time-to-plan models,
(7) It = w1S1t + w2S2t + w3S3t + w4S4t
where Sjt is the volume of projects j periods away from
completion at the beginning of period t and wj is the re-
source cost associated with work on a project j periods
away from completion, for j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Investment proj-
ects progress according to Sj,t+1 = Sj+1,t for j =1 ,2 ,3 ;a n d
starts during period t are represented by S4t. The capital
stock thus evolves according to
(8) Kt+1 = (1 – 0.021)Kt + S1t




imply that the resource costs of an investment project are
distributed evenly throughout the four periods of the proj-
ect. (That is, wj = 0.25, for j = 1, 2, 3, 4.) This is our
time-to-build parameterization.
To capture the planning feature of investment projects,
we consider w1 = 0.01 and wj = 0.33, for j = 2, 3, 4. This
is our time-to-plan parameterization.
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The three types of models are summarized in Table 1.
For a discussion of the empirical basis for the parameter
valuesweuse,seeChristianoandEichenbaum1992.From
here on, we shall be concerned primarily with describing
the properties of the version of the time-to-plan model in
which government matters. Other models and versions are
presented solely for comparison with that model.
. . . And How They Work
To gain insight into how the models work, we begin our
analysis by studying the dynamic responses of model vari-
ables to shocks to technology and government consump-
tion.Theseresponses areknown as impulseresponse func-
tions. We examine these responses only in the versions of
the models in which government matters.
Technology Shocks
Charts 1–6 depict, for each model, the responses to a posi-
tive 1 percent shock to the level of technology that occurs
in period 1.
8 Because of the random walk speciﬁcation,
the shock has a permanent impact on the level of technol-
ogy in all three models. The variables are expressed as a
percentage of their values on a nonstochastic steady-state
growth path. Each model has the property that eventually
all variables but hours worked rise by roughly 1 percent.
Hours worked eventually returns to its original pre-shock
value. In all three models, hours worked and investment
converge to their steady-state values from above (Charts 5
and 3), and the other variables converge from below.
There are three other notable features of these impulse
responses.Oneisthattheresponsesoftheone-periodtime-
to-build model and the time-to-build model are similar; in
both models, investment and hours worked surge immedi-
ately in the period of the shock, as households direct re-
sources toward exploiting the permanent jump in the level
of technology (Charts 3 and 5). Another notable feature of
the impulse responses is that the responses in the time-to-
plan model resemble those in the other models in the peri-
od after the shock, but not in the period of the shock. This
is because, recall, in the time-to-plan model, there is rela-
tively little to do in the period of the shock, since starting
up investment projects requires ﬁrst passing through a low
resource use planning phase. Thus, much of the increased
output generated by the technology shock is simply con-
sumed (Chart 2), hours worked actually falls a little (Chart
5), and investment shows hardly any response (Chart 3).
A third notable feature of the impulse responses is the ob-
vious sawtooth pattern in the time-to-build and time-to-
plan model responses which is not in those of the one-pe-
riod time-to-build model (Rouwenhorst 1991).
To gain insight into the reasons for the sawtooth pat-
terns, consider Chart 7, which displays the dynamic re-
sponse of starts, S4t, to the technology shock. The time-to-
build model exhibits a four-period cycle: high, low, low,
low. The time-to-plan model exhibits a three-period cycle:
high, low, low. These patterns can be understood as re-
ﬂecting efforts to concentrate investment activities in peri-
ods when resources are in relative abundance. For exam-
ple, a straightforward way to drive the stock of capital to
a higher steady state after a shock to technology is to
implement a step-function pattern in investment, with a
monotone declining sequence of steps, so that investment
converges to the new steady state from above. This policy
can be implemented by a declining sequence of jumps in
starts in periods 1, 5, 9, and so on, leaving starts un-
changed in the other periods. Though such a policy is un-
doubtedly feasible, Chart 7 indicates that it is not optimal
in either model. Relative to this feasible policy, the opti-
mal policy reschedules some starts from periods 1, 5, 9,
and so on, to the other periods. For example, in the time-
to-build model, shifting starts from period 1 to period 2 in
effect shifts consumption from period 5, when resources
are relatively abundant because new capital is just coming
on line and the pace of investment is reduced, to period 1,
when resources are relatively scarce.
Note in Chart 7 that the pattern of starts is different in
the two models. In the time-to-plan model, this impulse
response function has a three-period cycle. Presumably,
the reason the four-period cycle in the time-to-build model
is no longer optimal is that a surge in starts in period 4
does not represent a tax on resources until period 5, when
resources are relatively abundant for the reasons given
above. The projects started in period 4 will, in turn, come
on-line in period 8, which helps stimulate another surge of
starts in period 7, and so on.
ThesawtoothpatterninthequantityresponsesinCharts
1–6 reﬂects the pattern of starts. For example, the fact thatstarts are always positive is the reason investment rises
throughout most of the cycles displayed in Chart 3. In ad-
dition, each upward trend in hours worked (Chart 5) re-
ﬂects a similar trend in aggregate investment, with the ini-
tial large increase in starts followed by smaller increases.
Conditional on the pattern of investment, one can think of
theworkdecisionsassolvingasequenceofstaticproblems
(as in Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum 1992). With
after-investmentresourcesreducedinthesestaticproblems,
and with leisure being a normal good, the consumption of
leisure falls.
Government Consumption Shocks
Charts 8–13 depict, for each model, the responses to a pos-
itive 1 percent shock to the level of government consump-
tion that occurs in period 1.
9 Our speciﬁcation guarantees
that this shock has only a temporary impact on govern-
ment consumption and, hence, on all other variables in the
model.
Here, as with technology shocks, the impulse responses
oftheone-periodtime-to-buildmodelandthetime-to-build
model are qualitatively very similar. In both models, the
response to the government consumption shock is to raise
hours worked (Chart 12) and reduce consumption and
investment by a small amount (Charts 9 and 10).
10 How-
ever,theplanningperiodassumptionhasadifferentimpact
on the propagation of government consumption shocks
than on technology shocks. With both, it has the effect of
inhibiting the response of investment to the shock. But
this now has the effect of magnifying the impact on hours
worked and output. Since the amount of resources ab-
sorbed by investment is almost completely determined at
the time of a shock, the consumption/leisure problem in
the period of the shock is the solution to a static problem
in which investment plays the role of an exogenous tax,
and the increase in government consumption operates like
an exogenous drop in income. The assumption that leisure
is a normal good, implicit in our speciﬁcation of utility,
then guarantees that hours worked must rise sharply.
Results
Our objective is to investigate the business cycle implica-
tions of key features of investment gestation lags. To do
this, we need a quantitative characterization of business
cycles. The characterization we adopt is a speciﬁc set of
correlations and standard deviations computed using de-
trended data. For ease of comparability, the set of statistics
and the detrending method we adopt include the conven-
tional ones used in the business cycle literature. For con-
venience, we here report the business cycle statistics for
postwar U.S. data. We then go on to report the correspond-
ing statistics for our models.
The U.S. Data
Table 2 reports key business cycle statistics for the U.S.
economy. Since these have been analyzed elsewhere (in
Kydland and Prescott 1990, for example), they need not
be discussed in detail here. Still, we want to emphasize
three sets of facts.
First, the bottom row of Table 2 displays the autocorre-
lation of U.S. GDP growth. Note that the lag 1 autocorre-
lation is 0.37, with a small standard error of 0.07. The lag
2 autocorrelation is also signiﬁcantly above zero, but the
next-higher autocorrelation is not signiﬁcantly different
from zero. These statistics measure the persistence in ag-
gregate output.
Second,inthedynamiccross-correlationbetweenhours
and productivity, the contemporaneous correlation is near-
ly zero, while the correlation between productivity and fu-
ture hours is positive and quite signiﬁcant.
Third, aggregate investment is contemporaneous with
the cycle. However, this fairly simple cyclical pattern ac-
tually disguises more heterogeneous cyclical behavior at
the disaggregated level. To see this, look again at Table 2.
There we also report results for two subcomponents of in-
vestment: structures and durable goods. These two are fur-
ther disaggregated, with structures divided into business
and residential and durables divided into business equip-
ment and household durables.
Two notable features emerge here. One is that business
investment in structures and business investment in equip-
ment lag the business cycle. In light of the evidence pre-
sented in Mayer 1960 and Krainer 1968, we think these
data can reasonably be interpreted as reﬂecting investment
planning delays. We suspect that the planning period nec-
essary for equipment investment is shorter than that for
structures. Still, to the extent that there are complementari-
ties between structures and equipment, we would expect
planning delays in structures investment to induce some
delaysinequipmentinvestmenttoo.Anotherfeatureworth
noting is that residential investment in structures and in-
vestment in household durables both lead the business cy-
cle. This feature suggests that signiﬁcant planning periods
may not be required for these types of investment.
The size of the standard errors for all these types of in-
vestment suggests that there is considerable sampling un-
certainty in the data, so caution is warranted in making in-
ferences about their cyclical properties.
The Model Statistics
Table 3 presents the results for our models. The entries in
the table are selected with the objective of shedding light
on the role played by time to build, time to plan, and gov-
ernment consumption shocks. That is, the four sets of sta-
tistics in the table isolate the effects of adding, one by
one, multiperiod time to build, time to plan, and govern-
ment consumption to a baseline one-period time-to-build
model in which government does not matter.
Consider the results for that baseline model. A detailed
discussion of its business cycle implications appears in
Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992. Notable among these
are the model’s success in accounting for the observed
relative smoothness of consumption (private plus govern-
ment) and its failure in accounting for the observed low
volatility of productivity relative to hours worked (Hansen
1985). Here we want to point out three other things. First,
there is essentially no persistence in aggregate output; out-
put growth displays basically zero autocorrelation at lags
1, 2, and 3. Second, hours worked is contemporaneous
with productivity over the cycle, in the sense that the max-
imal value in their dynamic correlation appears at lag zero.
And ﬁnally, investment neither leads nor lags output over
the cycle.
Now consider what happens when we introduce time-
to-build considerations alone, abstracting from planning
considerations and from government consumption shocks.
There are at least two things to note here. First, the dy-
namics of consumption are substantially altered: the rela-tive volatility of consumption is quite high, and the con-
temporaneous correlation of consumption with output is
low. Second, the volatility of productivity in relation to
hours worked is higher than before. Intuition for these re-
sults may be obtained by studying the impulse response
functions in Charts 1–6.
11 There, in the time-to-build
model compared to in the one-period time-to-build model,
consumption responds more to a shock (Chart 2), hours
worked responds less (Chart 5), and, hence, productivity
responds more (Chart 6). Thus, the small changes intro-
duced by time to build actually hurt the model’s ability to
account for business cycles.
Now consider the results for the time-to-plan model in
which government doesn’t matter. Note that the degree of
persistence has increased substantially, even overshooting
the corresponding empirical quantity somewhat, at least at
lag 1. Also, productivity now leads hours worked over the
cycle. Interestingly, the impact on the contemporaneous
correlation between hours and productivity is quite sub-
stantial; that correlation drops from roughly 0.90 in the
other two models to 0.28 in the time-to-plan model. Qual-
itatively, these results were anticipated by the impulse re-
sponse functions in Charts 1–6.
Other time-to-plan model implications include that in-
vestment lags output over the business cycle. Although
this is not consistent with the evidence on aggregate in-
vestment, it is qualitatively consistent with the evidence
on business investment in structures and equipment. Time
to plan also has two important impacts on the dynamics
of consumption. First, consumption now leads the cycle.
The reason for this is clear from the impulse response
functions in Charts 1 and 2: Consumption surges in the
period of the shock, while the impact on output is de-
layed.Thisimplicationofthemodeliscounterfactual.Sec-
ond, model performance deteriorates noticeably with re-
spect to the relative volatility of consumption and its cor-
relation with output. This also reﬂects the very strong re-
sponse of consumption in the period of the shock.
Finally, we can assess the effects of letting government
consumption shocks matter in the time-to-plan model.
There are at least four things worth emphasizing about
switching to this version of the model.
First, the incorporation of government consumption
shocks actually reduces the degree of persistence in out-
put. This is not surprising in view of the previous analysis,
which shows that time to plan enhances the response of
hours worked to a relatively transient government con-
sumption shock. By reducing the model’s implied ﬁrst-or-
der autocorrelation of consumption to 0.36, government
consumption shocks bring the model into rough conformi-
ty with the corresponding empirical estimate.
Second, the introduction of government consumption
shocks does not alter the model’s implication that produc-
tivity leads hours worked. However, it does generate a
marginal improvement by producing an overall reduction
in the dynamic correlation between hours worked and pro-
ductivity. (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992 discusses the
economics underlying this result.)
Third, the introduction of government consumption
shocks reduces the relative volatility of consumption, off-
setting a counterfactual implication of the model without
government consumption shocks.
Fourth, government consumption shocks contribute al-
most nothing to output volatility. It is because technology
shocks dominate in the dynamic behavior of the model
that time to plan results in so much persistence in output
growth.
Concluding Remarks
Studies of major investment projects suggest that these
projects begin with a lengthy planning period, during
which the direct expenditure of resources is relatively
small. This is the time when architects draw up plans, ﬁ-
nancing is arranged, environmental impact statements are
produced, permits are obtained from various local authori-
ties, and so on. We have shown that this planning period
may help account for several key features of business cy-
cles:theirpersistence,thefactthatproductivityleadshours
worked over the cycle, and the fact that business invest-
ment in structures and business investment in equipment
lag output over the cycle.
To demonstrate this, we incorporated a planning period
for investment into an otherwise standard real business
cycle model. We did so by adopting a four-period time-
to-build investment technology in which only a negligible
amount of resources is used in the ﬁrst period. The plan-
ning period induces a delay in the equilibrium response
of hours worked, which in turn induces a delay in the re-
sponse of output. The latter delayed response is respon-
sible for the model’s ability to account for the observed
persistence in output. The delay in the response of hours
worked, together with the fact that a technology shock
immediately raises productivity, accounts for the fact that
productivity leads hours worked over the business cycle.
The model also predicts that investment lags output
over the business cycle and that consumption leads. These
implicationsare counterfactual,giventhe levelofaggrega-
tion in the model: quarterly U.S. aggregate consumption
and investment appear to be contemporaneous with the
cycle. However, we believe these shortcomings of our
model are not fundamental.
The cyclical behavior of aggregate investment masks
considerable heterogeneity in the cyclical properties of the
components of investment. In particular, business invest-
ment in structures and business investment in equipment
lag output over the business cycle, whileresidential invest-
ment and household durables lead. We suspect that a mod-
el which distinguishes among these categories of invest-
ment, assumes a signiﬁcant planning period for business
structuresinvestmentonly,andspeciﬁesthatstructuresand
equipment are complementary can overcome some of the
deﬁciencies of our model.
The assumption of a planning period for business in-
vestment in structures should make that form of invest-
ment lagthebusinesscycle,andcomplementaritybetween
structures and equipment should induce a lag in equip-
ment investment as well. At the same time, the factors
that make consumption lead the cycle in our model should
make residential investment and household durables lead
the cycle in a modiﬁed model. In our model, the reason
consumption leads output over the cycle is that consump-
tion surges in the period of the technology shock: there is
nowhere else for the extra resources to go, since invest-
ment cannot be changed in the short run. In a modiﬁed
model, a major category of investment would be available
for absorbing such resources, and we expect householdsin such a model to take advantage of it. We conjecture that
in the modiﬁed model, residential investment and house-
holddurableswillleadthecyclebecausesuchamodelwill
still have a delay in the response of hours worked and,
hence, output to a shock. The delay, though probably not
as strong as in our model, will nevertheless be there be-
cause of the binding short-run constraint on expanding the
resources devoted to business investment in structures.
In part, these comments are meant to emphasize that
we view our work primarily as preliminary and, we hope,
suggestive. Further analysis of quantitative models is re-
quired to fully evaluate the idea that the planning period
plays an important role in propagating business cycle
shocks.
Further empirical work along the lines of Mayer 1960
and Krainer 1968 is also needed. For example, it would
beinterestingtoknowtowhatextentﬁrmsdoprojectplan-
ning in advance, so that when the incentive arises, they
have access to an inventory of already-planned investment
projects that can be implemented immediately. To the ex-
tent that this is true, the business cycle signiﬁcance of the
planning considerations analyzed here would be reduced.
*Christiano acknowledges the ﬁnancial assistance of the National Science Foun-
dation.
1There are other examples of this type of research. Microeconomic evidence on
the heterogeneous earning experiences of different households has been used to restrict
macroeconomic models with limited insurance and idiosyncratic income uncertainty.
Microeconomic studies of the degree of risk aversion of households, their labor supply
elasticities, and their activities in the home have been used to restrict the parameters of
utility functions in macroeconomic models.
2Our analysis is based on a review of the principal source cited by Kydland and
Prescott 1982—Mayer 1960—as well as of Krainer 1968. These articles analyze the
results of questionnaires about major capital projects undertaken by industrial ﬁrms.
Complementary evidence on the planning period for investment projects appears in a
study by Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967). They examine time series data on gross in-
vestment for 15 industries and ﬁnd (1967, p.17) that “investment expenditure lags be-
hind its determinants by six to 12 quarters...o nt h eaverage.”
3For example,Krainer (1968) ﬁndsthat expenditures onmajor investment projects
exhibit the classic S-curve shape, with very low expenditures initially. He studies 25
projects, mostly 1–2 years in duration. In all these projects, in the ﬁrst three months,
less than 5 percent of the total project cost was incurred. In 18 of them, that portion
was actually less than 2.5 percent. Krainer’s results understate the length of the plan-
ning period because he dates the conception of a project with its approval by a compa-
ny’s board of directors. Presumably, much planning has already been done for a project
before that point. Mayer (1960) dates the start of a project by the ﬁrst drawing up of
plans. In Mayer’s (1960) data, on average, projects took 22 months, with the ﬁrst 7
months being the preconstruction planning phase.
4The primary effect of time to build in Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) model is to
make the capital stock lag output over the cycle, so that its correlation with output turns
negative. Rouwenhorst (1991) also argues that the business cycle implications of Kyd-
land and Prescott’s time-to-build speciﬁcation are not substantial.
5Other features have been analyzed too. For example, search models of the labor
market emphasize the time-intensive nature of ﬁnding and changing employment. For
that type of study, see Mortensen 1992; Andolfatto 1993; Ljungqvist and Sargent 1995;
and Merz, forthcoming. Financial market frictions explored by Fuerst (1992), Fisher
(1994a), and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) also have the effect of delaying the
response of factors of production to shocks. Other discussions of the implications for
persistence of limitations on the ability of labor and capital to respond to shocks are in-
vestigated by Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993); Burnside and Eichenbaum
(1994); Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1995); and Christiano and Fisher (1995).
6Thoughwehavenotexploredthisformally,thisreasoningsuggeststhatwewould
see a different result for government consumption shocks which are even more persis-
tent than in our model. Then households would have a motive to actually build up capi-
tal in the period of the shock. Using the same reasoning used to understand the impact
of the planning period with the technology shock, we conjecture that the effect of the
planningperiodwithhighlypersistentgovernmentconsumptionshockswouldbetode-
lay the response of hours worked.
7Our speciﬁcations are not consistent with the results of Mayer (1960) and Krainer
(1968) in two respects. One is that the investment projects they study have a duration
of approximately two years. We nevertheless adopt the one-year speciﬁcation in order
to preserve comparability with the existing literature and in order to capture the mix be-
tween major and minor investment projects. The other inconsistency is that resource
costs at the end of the investment projects studied by Krainer tend to be relatively low.
One interpretation of this is that w4 is low. We adopt (implicitly) an alternative interpre-
tation, that investment projects are already producing during this phase.
As noted by McGrattan (1989), a potentially useful source for data on time-to-
build weights is the U.S. Department of Commerce’s “Construction Reports.” These
report the proportion of total cost put into place in each month of building projects of
various sizes. Unfortunately, these reports contain little evidence on the magnitude of
w1, since they refer only to work done after physical construction begins. As we have
noted elsewhere, in the sample of projects studied by Mayer (1960), construction did
not typically begin until one-third of the total time devoted to an investment project had
elapsed.
8That is, in all periods except the period of the shock, we set l to its mean of
0.004. In the period of the shock, we set l = 0.014.
9In all periods except the period of the shock, we set µ to its mean of 0. In the pe-
riod of the shock, we set µ = 0.01.
10Recall equation (2): consumption Ct = C
p
t + yGt, where C
p
t is private consump-
tion and Gt government consumption. However, since y = 0 in the models used in
Charts 1–13, Ct = C
p
t in them; that is, total consumption and private consumption are
identical.
11Recall that the responses in these charts are for the versions of the models in
which government matters. However, the basic shapes are similar for responses from
the versions in which government doesn’t matter.
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my 101 (December): 1011–41.Type of Model* Description
One-Period Standard real business cycle model
Time-to-Build
Time-to-Build Even distribution of resource costs
across four periods:
v1 = v2 = v3 = v4  = 0.25
Time-to-Plan Few resource costs in first
of four periods:
v1 = 0.01, v2 = v3 = v4  = 0.33
*For each of the three types of models, when c = 0, government
consumption shocks matter, and when c = 1, they do not.
Table 1
The ModelsCharts 1–6
Responses to a Technology Shock
Percentage Deviations From Unshocked Steady-State Paths
After a 1 Percent Unexpected Increase in the Level of Technology in Period 1
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*These are the versions of the models in which government matters; that is, in equation (2), c =0 .
In these models, therefore, total consumption and private consumption are identical.
Model:* One-Period Time-to-Build Time-to-Plan
Time-to-BuildChart 7
Response of Starts
to a Technology Shock
Percentage Deviations From Unshocked Steady-State Paths
After a 1 Percent Unexpected Increase in the Level
of Technology in Period 1
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*In both models, government matters;




Responses to a Government Consumption Shock
Percentage Deviations From Unshocked Steady-State Paths 
After a 1 Percent Unexpected Increase in the Level of Government Consumption in Period 1
Chart 9    Consumption 
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Chart 8    Output 



















Model:* One-Period Time-to-Build Time-to-Plan
Time-to-Build
*In all three models, government matters; in equation (2), c = 0. In these models,
therefore, total consumption and private consumption are identical.Variables† Relative Dynamic Correlations of A(t) With B(t – j), Where j = 
AB s B / sA 3 2 1 0 –1 –2 –3
Output, Y — .0179** .40 .65 .86 1.00 .86 .65 .40
(.08) (.07) (.04) (.00) (.04) (.06) (.08)
Output, Y Consumption, C .46 .42 .61 .76 .78 .66 .48 .30
(.03) (.09) (.08) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.08) (.09)
Y Investment, I 2.91 .43 .57 .68 .71 .56 .33 .08
(.22) (.09) (.09) (.08) (.09) (.11) (.13) (.15)
Structures
Y Business 2.67 –.16 .03 .25 .46 .56 .59 .53
(.28) (.10) (.10) (.09) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.10)
Y Residential 6.04 .57 .63 .61 .49 .26 .00 –.21
(.52) (.10) (.09) (.10) (.11) (.13) (.14) (.13)
Durable Goods
Y Business Equipment 3.43 .16 .38 .62 .80 .81 .68 .48
(.20) (.09) (.08) (.06) (.04) (.05) (.07) (.09)
Y Household Durables 3.04 .44 .48 .51 .49 .30 .09 –.15
(.29) (.11) (.12) (.12) (.13) (.14) (.14) (.15)
Y Government Consumption, G 2.14 –.01 .10 .21 .34 .43 .47 .48
(.37) (.14) (.12) (.11) (.11) (.12) (.13) (.13)
Y Hours Worked, n .82 .18 .41 .66 .82 .81 .69 .52
(.06) (.09) (.08) (.05) (.03) (.05) (.07) (.09)
Y Productivity, Y/n .58 .42 .53 .55 .55 .32 .12 –.06
(.05) (.10) (.09) (.08) (.09) (.11) (.12) (.12)
Hours Worked, n Productivity, Y/n .70 .35 .33 .21 –.03 –.07 –.17 –.24
(.08) (.09) (.09) (.10) (.11) (.12) (.11) (.09)
Output Growth, DY — .0099** .03 .22 .37 1.00 .37 .22 .03
(.08) (.08) (.07) (.00) (.07) (.08) (.08)
*Hours-worked data are for 1947:1–1993:4.
**These numbers are simple, not relative, standard deviations.
†Variable definitions and Citibase codes are as follows: Y = Gross domestic product = GDPQ; C = Consumption of
nondurable goods and services = GCNQ + GCSQ; I = Business fixed investment + Consumption of durable goods
= GIFQ + GCDQ; Business investment in structures = GISQ; Residential investment = GIRQ; Business equipment
investment = GIPDQ; Household investment in durable goods = GCDQ; G = Government consumption = GGEQ;
n = Hours worked by employed labor force = LHOURS; DY = The first difference of the log of per capita gross
domestic product. Note that the measure of C places a weight of zero on government consumption.
All variables except output growth have been logged and detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. All variables
have been divided by GPOP, a non–seasonally-adjusted measure of population (including armed forces overseas)
and are measured in 1987 dollar terms.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors computed as in Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992. For estimation of
the relevant zero-frequency spectral density, a Bartlett window, truncated at lag 4, was used.
Source: Citicorp’s Citibase data bank
Table 2
Selected U.S. Business Cycle Statistics
Quarterly, 1947:1–1995:1,* Seasonally Adjusted
VolatilityVariables Relative Dynamic Correlations of A(t) With B(t – j), Where j = 
Model AB s B / sA 3 2 1 0 –1 –2 –3
Government One-Period Y — .021** .31 .51 .74 1.00 .75 .51 .31
Doesn’t Matter Time-to-Build YC .55 .23 .44 .69 .98 .78 .59 .41
Yl 2.37 .36 .55 .76 .99 .70 .45 .24
Yn .38 .39 .57 .77 .98 .67 .40 .18
Y Y/n .63 .26 .47 .71 .99 .78 .57 .39
n Y/n 1.65 .11 .33 .61 .94 .77 .61 .45
DY — .016** .01 .03 .04 1.00 .04 .03 .01
Time-to-Build Y — .018** .25 .45 .70 1.00 .70 .45 .25
YC .76 .03 .12 .24 .39 .26 .17 .15
Yl 2.26 .29 .48 .71 .98 .70 .45 .22
Yn .35 .31 .49 .70 .95 .69 .43 .18
Y Y/n .67 .21 .42 .67 .99 .68 .45 .28
n Y/n 1.91 .13 .40 .65 .89 .68 .49 .34
DY — .014** –.01 .00 .01 1.00 .01 .00 –.01
Time-to-Plan Y — .017** .30 .53 .82 1.00 .82 .53 .30
YC .91 .13 .24 .39 .35 .05 .01 .02
Yl 2.48 .22 .39 .60 .87 .94 .64 .36
Yn .47 .14 .25 .39 .68 .91 .62 .34
Y Y/n .76 .31 .55 .83 .89 .52 .32 .19
n Y/n 1.63 .39 .66 .91 .28 .24 .17 .12
DY — .011** .01 .01 .40 1.00 .40 .01 .01
Government Time-to-Plan Y — .018** .30 .53 .81 1.00 .81 .53 .30
Matters YC .67 .26 .46 .70 .70 .29 .16 .10
Yl 2.21 .21 .38 .59 .84 .93 .63 .36
YG 2.00 .24 .41 .61 .72 .50 .32 .18
Yn .54 .17 .30 .47 .74 .87 .59 .33
Y Y/n .70 .30 .52 .79 .85 .49 .30 .18
n Y/n 1.29 .33 .56 .78 .28 .22 .15 .11
DY — .012** .00 .01 .36 1.00 .36 .01 .00
*Statistics are based on 2,000 artificial observations from the indicated model.
For data descriptions, see notes to Table 2, except that here consumption, C,
also includes cG, where G is government consumption. When government
doesn’t matter, c=1, and when it does, c =0.
**These numbers are simple, not relative, standard deviations.
Table 3
Selected Model Statistics*
Volatility